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Abstract: We consider a cloud-based control architecture in which the local plants outsource
the control synthesis task to the cloud. In particular, we consider a cloud-based reinforcement
learning (RL), where updating the value function is outsourced to the cloud. To achieve
confidentiality, we implement computations over Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). We
use a CKKS encryption scheme and a modified SARSA(0) reinforcement learning to incorporate
the encryption-induced delays. We then give a convergence result for the delayed updated rule
of SARSA(0) with a blocking mechanism. We finally present a numerical demonstration via
implementing on a classical pole-balancing problem.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Certain control algorithms such as Model Predictive Con-
trol (MPC) and visual servoing require heavy real-time
computational operations while on-site controllers in in-
dustrial control systems are often resource-constrained.
The cloud-based control may resolve this issue by allow-
ing on-site controllers to outsource their computations to
cloud computers. Many such cloud-based control schemes
have been proposed recently in the literature. For instance,
Hegazy and Hefeeda (2014) considered a cloud-based MPC
architecture with an application to large-scale power plant
operations. Wu et al. (2012) considered a cloud-based
visual servoing architecture, where an UDP-based com-
munication protocol was developed for latency reduction.
Despite the computational advantages, a naive implemen-
tation of cloud-based control can leak operational records
of clients control systems, which often contain sensitive
information. Since private information can be a valuable
asset in our modern society, an appropriate privacy pro-
tecting mechanism is a critical requirement for cloud-based
control services in practice. Both non-cryptographic (e.g.,
differential privacy) and cryptographic (e.g., homomorphic
encryption (HE), the focus of this paper) approaches have
been considered in the literature.
Cloud-based control over HE is pioneered by Kogiso and
Fujita (2015), Farokhi et al. (2016), Kim et al. (2016),
followed by rapid developments of related technologies in
more recent works. The focus of the literature to date
has been mainly on the cloud-based implementations of
control policies (Fig. 1 (a)). In such scenarios, the role
of the cloud is to evaluate the values of control actions
at = pit(st) in the ciphertext domain based on the en-
crypted values of the system output st, where the control
policy pit is given in advance. In this paper, we consider a
different scenario motivated by cloud-based control syn-
thesis problems (Fig. 1 (b)). In this scenario, the role
of the cloud is to construct a control policy pit while
the synthesized policy may be implemented locally by
the client. Control synthesis problems are classified into
model-based and data-driven approaches. In model-based
approaches, a mathematical model of the system to be
controlled is explicitly used for the policy construction
(e.g., synthesis of explicit MPC laws; Bemporad et al.
(2002)), while data-driven approaches construct a policy
pit from the historical input-output data without using
system models (e.g., reinforcement learning). Since there
are scenarios in which control synthesis involves heavy
computations (e.g., explicit MPC for time-varying sys-
tems, reinforcement learning by deep Q-network; Mnih
et al. (2015)), it will be beneficial to consider cloud-based
implementations of such computational procedures. To the
best of our knowledge, cloud-based control synthesis over
HE has not been investigated in the literature yet.
Although a large portion of the existing work on control
over HE is restricted to partially homomorphic encryption
(PHE) schemes (notable exceptions include Kim et al.
(2019)), this paper adopts a framework of FHE schemes.
This is because it is hard to find a useful application of
PHE schemes (which support only addition or multiplica-
tion in ciphertext domain) in control synthesis problems,
where more advanced algebraic operations are typically
required. As a step forward to general control synthesis
over FHE, this paper focuses on implementing one of the
most elementary reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms,
namely the SARSA(0) algorithm. We note that RL over
FHE is largely unexplored, while supervised learning over
FHE has been studied in recent years, e.g., Dowlin et al.
(2016). To deal with delays due to computational overhead
by FHE, we consider a modified SARSA(0) and discuss
its convergence properties. We implement the modified
SARSA(0) over Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) encryp-
tion scheme and apply it to a benchmark RL problem (pole
balancing) to demonstrate the feasibility of our study.
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(a) Cloud-based implementation. (b) Cloud-based synthesis.
Fig. 1. Cloud-based implementation of control policies vs.
cloud-based control synthesis. Control synthesis can
be based on plant models (model-based approach) or
operational data (data-driven approach).
In the remainder of this paper, we first summarize
the overview of HE schemes in Section 2. A modified
SARSA(0) algorithm is described in Section 3, and the
results of numerical experiments are shown in Section 4.
We conclude in Section 5 with future research directions.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is an encryption method
that possess homomorphic properties with respect to ad-
dition and/or multiplcation operations. Modern cryptog-
raphy can be classified into two categories, namely sym-
metric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption.
Symmetric key encryption model assumes that the en-
cryption and decryption keys are interchangeable. For ex-
ample, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a widely
known symmetric encryption algorithm. On the other
hand, asymmetric key encryption, often known as public-
key encryption, requires the decryption key to be different
from the encryption key. Thus, a public-key homomorphic
encryption method can enable cloud outsourced computa-
tions with data protection. A comprehensive introduction
to this technology can be found otherwise in Yi et al.
(2014).
2.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption is Partially Homomorphic if
only one opeartion (either an addition or a multiplica-
tion) is preserved. Some popular Partially Homomorphic
Encryption schemes include ElGamal Cryptosystem and
Paillier Cryptosystem. The former is homomorphic with
respect to multiplication and the latter with addition.
Recently, both schemes have been applied in control lit-
eratures, Kogiso and Fujita (2015), Farokhi et al. (2016),
Alexandru et al. (2018), and Schulze Darup et al. (2018).
If both additions and multiplications are preserved but
for a limited number of operations, then the encryp-
tion scheme is called Somewhat (Leveled) Homomorphic.
Gentry (2009) proved that any Somewhat Homomorphic
scheme with a bootstrapping procedure can be promoted
to Fully Homomorphic Encryption by controlling the noise
growth in ciphertexts. Since then, many more efficient
schemes emerged. It is also worth mentioning that many
of recent generation FHE schemes are among a few candi-
dates for Quantum-resistant cryptosystem, Lange (2015).
A more in-depth coverage on FHE can be found in Halevi
(2017).
2.2 CKKS Encryption scheme
Cheon et al. (2016) developed a CKKS scheme. A boot-
strapping procedure for CKKS was proposed by Cheon
et al. (2018), thus elevating it to a fully homommorphic
encryption scheme. CKKS is unique in that it can encrypt
a vector of complex numbers and can perform approxi-
mate arithmetic as opposed to other schemes, which en-
crypt integers and perform exact arithmetic. Note that
a special encoding structure is necessary as the plaintext
space of CKKS scheme is an integer-coefficient polynomial
ring modulo cyclotomic polynomial. A detailed review of
CKKS scheme is out of scope of this paper and we refer
Cheon et al. (2016).
CKKS scheme’s precision loss is only slightly more than
a precision loss due to the unencrypted floating point
arithmetic. Therefore, this scheme is very convenient for
control applications. A small precision loss can be modeled
as an existing disturbance and applications involving large
data can reap benefits via batched operations. Moreover,
Microsoft SEAL provides an open-source library that
supports CKKS with a simple tutorial for the use.
2.3 Cloud-based control over homomorphic encryption
More recently, the secure evaluation of affine control law
for explicit MPC using Paillier Cryptosystem (PCS) is
shown in Schulze Darup et al. (2018). In Alexandru et al.
(2018), an implicit MPC control evaluation using PCS was
shown to be possible through the projected Fast Gradient
Method and the use of a communication protocol. Also, in
Darup et al. (2018), a PCS encrypted implicit MPC was
shown via the use of real-time proximal gradient method.
But due to the nature of PCS, or any other partially
homomorphic schemes, some parameters are assumed to
be public. This is a valid assumption in some cases but
may not fit some other scenarios.
On the other hand, FHE is not as adopted as PHE in
control systems because it is still far more computationally
demanding compared to PHE. Nonetheless, the feasibility
of using the FHE for a cloud-based control system was
first shown in Kim et al. (2016). Subsequently, in Kim
et al. (2019), a secure dynamic control was proposed
using LWE-based FHE and a critical observation was that
the noise growth of FHE is bounded by the stability of
the closed-loop system under some conditions, eliminating
the need for bootstrapping, which is one of the most
computationally involved procedure.
Previous attempts to apply homomorphic encryption to
cloud-based control mostly focused on cloud-based im-
plementations of control laws. In many cases, implemen-
tations of control laws imposes stringent real-timeness
requirements (10 − 100 milliseconds), which significantly
restricts the use of homomorphic encryption, which intro-
duces delay. Instead of focusing on the control implemen-
tations, we apply homomorphic enryption to cloud-based
control synthesis (computation of feedback control policies
to be implemented) as seen in Figure 1(b). Compared to
Figure 1(a), we assume that a feedback control policy
at = pit(s1:t) is implemented by the client. Since sensor
data st and control command at are not encrypted, fast
implementation of the control policy is possible.
The role of the cloud in our model is to update the
control policy pit based on the uploaded information by
the client. In a model-based design scenario, the client
uploads encrypted plant information Pt(·|·, ·) based on
which the cloud synthesize a policy pit. In a data-driven
scenario (such as reinforcement learning), the client upload
encrypted operational record of the system (e.g., action at,
observation st and reward signal) based on which the cloud
synthesize a policy pit. Since the time scales of control
synthesis (i.e., the frequency at which control policies
are updated) are typically much slower than that of
implementation, we expect that the existing FHE schemes
can be fruitfully applied.
3. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING OVER FULLY
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Consider a Markov decision process (MDP) defined by a
tuple (S,A, P, r), where S is a finite state space, A is a
finite action space, P (st+1|st, at) is the state transition
probability and r(st, at) is the reward. A policy is a
sequence of stochastic kernels pi = (pi1, pi2, ...), where
pit(at|s1:t, a1:t−1) assigns the probability of selecting the
next action at ∈ A given the history (s1:t, a1:t−1). For a
fixed policy pi, the value of each state s ∈ S is defined by
V pi(s) = Epi
[ ∞∑
t=1
γtr(st, at)|s0 = s
]
,
where 0 ≤ γ < 1 is a predefined discount factor. We
say that a policy pi∗ is optimal if it maximizes the
value of each state simultaneously. The existence of time-
invariant, Markov, and deterministic optimal policy under
the present setup is well-known, (e.g., Bertsekas (2011)).
Consequently, an optimal policy of the form at = pi
∗(st)
can be assumed without loss of performance. The value
function V ∗ under an optimal policy pi∗ satisfies the Bell-
man’s equation
V ∗(s) = max
a∈A
[
r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V ∗(s′)
]
. (1)
3.1 Q-learning
The focus of reinforcement learning algorithms in general
is to construct an optimal policy pi∗ based on the observed
history of the states, actions, and reward signals. The
Q-learning, Watkins and Dayan (1992), achieves this by
attempting the construction of the optimal Q-function
defined by
Q∗(s, a) := r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V ∗(s′) (2)
for each (s, a) ∈ S × A. It follows from the Bellman’s
equation (1) that
Q∗(s, a) = r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a) max
a′∈A
Q∗(s′, a′)
for each (s, a) ∈ S × A. Once Q∗ is obtained, an optimal
policy can also be obtained by pi∗(s) = arg maxa∈AQ
∗(s, a).
Let {αn}n=0,1,2,... be a predefined sequence such that
0 ≤ αn ≤ 1 ∀n,
∑∞
n=0 αn =∞ and
∑∞
n=0 α
2
n <∞. Denote
by nt(s, a) the number of times that the state-action pair
(s, a) has been visited prior to the time step t. 1 Upon the
observation of (st, at, rt, st+1), the Q-learning updates the
(st, at) entry of the Q-function by
Qt(st, at) = (1− αnt(st,at))Qt−1(st, at)
+ αnt(st,at)
(
rt + γ max
a′∈A
Qt−1(st+1, a′)
)
. (3)
No update is made to the (s, a) entry if (s, a) 6= (st, at).
The following result is standard in the literature:
Theorem 1. For an arbitrarily chosen initial Q-function
Q0, the convergence Qt(s, a) → Q∗(s, a) as t → ∞ holds
under the update rule (3) provided each state-action pair
(s, a) ∈ S ×A is visited infinitely often.
In what follows, we assume that the underlying MDP is
communicating, i.e., every state can by reached from every
other state under certain policies.
3.2 SARSA(0)
The Q-learning method described above is considered an
off-policy reinforcement learning algorithm in the sense
that the hypothetical action a′ in the update rule (3)
need not be actually selected as at+1. The SARSA(0) algo-
rithm, on the other hand, is an on-policy counterpart that
performs the Q-function update based on the experienced
trajectory (st, at, rt, st+1, at+1):
Qt(st, at) =(1− αnt(st,at))Qt−1(st, at)
+ αnt(st,at) (rt + γQt−1(st+1, at+1)) . (4)
Here, we remark that the absence of the max operation in
(4) is a significant advantage for the implementation over
FHE because the current polynomial approximations of
comparison operations are highly inefficient, Cheon et al.
(2019).
The convergence of SARSA(0) can be guaranteed under
certain conditions. Although a complete discussion must
be differed to Singh et al. (2000), roughly speaking it
requires that (i) the learning policy is infinitely exploring,
i.e., each state-action pair (s, a) ∈ S×A is visited infinitely
often; and (ii) the learning policy is greedy in the limit, i.e.,
the probability that at+1 6= arg maxa′∈AQt−1(st+1, a′)
tends to zero. Condition (i) is required for the convergence
of Q-learning (off-policy counterpart of SARSA). The
additional condition (ii) is needed due to the on-policy
nature of SARSA(0). The following is a simple example of
learning policies satisfying (i) and (ii):
Definition 2. (Decreasing  policy) Let nt(s) be the num-
ber of times that the state s has been visited prior to
time step t and define t(s) = c/nt(s) for some 0 < c <
1. We say that pi is a decreasing  policy if it selects
an action at+1 randomly with the uniform distribution
over A with probability t+1(st+1) and the greedy action
arg maxa∈AQt−1(st+1, a) with probability 1− t+1(st+1).
The following result is a consequence of Theorem 1 in
Singh et al. (2000).
1 If (s, a) is visited for the first time at t = 1, then n1(s, a) = 0 and
n2(s, a) = 1.
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Fig. 2. Q-table update with blocking states.
Theorem 3. For an arbitrarily chosen Q0, the convergence
Qt(s, a) → Q∗(s, a) as t → ∞ for each state-action pair
(s, a) ∈ S × A occurs with probability one under the
SARSA(0) update rule (4) and the decreasing  policy.
Proof. (Outline only) The result relies on the convergence
of stochastic approximation (Singh et al., 2000, Lemma
1), whose premises are satisfied if the learning policy
is Greedy in the limit with infinite exploration (GLIE):
(i) infinitely exploring, and (ii) greedy in the limit in
that E|Qt−1(st+1, at+1) − maxa∈AQt−1(st+1, a)| → 0 as
t → ∞ with probability one. To verify (i), we note that,
under the assumption of communicating MDP, performing
each action infinitely often in each state is sufficient to
guarantee the infinite exploration of states. Let ts(i) be the
time step that the state s is visited the i-th time. Since we
are adopting the decreasing  policy, e.g., t(s) = c/nt(s)
with 0 < c < 1, Pr(ats(j) = a) is dependent on Pr(ats(i) =
a). But by the extended Borel-Cantelli lemma, we have
w.p.1
∑∞
i=1 Pr(ats(i) = a) = ∞ for each a ∈ A. Thus, by
Lemma 4 (Singh, 2000), we have nt(s, a)→∞ a.s., where
nt(s, a) denotes the number of actions performed at state
s at time t. The condition (ii) holds by construction of
the decreasing -greedy policy. The conditions 1, 2, and 3
of the Theorem 1 in Singh et al. (2000) are satisfied by
construction.
3.3 SARSA(0) with blocking states
Now, consider a cloud-based implementation of SARSA(0).
We assume that the Q-function update (4) is performed
by the cloud while the decreasing  policy is implemented
by the client. As shown in Fig. 1(b), at each time step
t, the client can encrypt and upload a new data set
zt = (st, at, rt, st+1, at+1) and, upon the completion of the
Q-function update (4) on the cloud, the updated entry
of the Q-function is downloaded and decrypted. If the
computation of Q-update takes less than a unit time inter-
val, then SARSA(0) together with the decreasing  policy
as described above can be implemented in the considered
cloud-based architecture without any modifications.
However, encrypted Q-update can take up to some L(≥ 2)
unit time intervals. In such scenarios, a new data set
may arrive before the previous Q-update is complete. For
simplicity, we assume there is no communication delay
between the cloud and the client. In what follows, we
propose a modified SARSA, which we call SARSA(0) with
blocking states. The proposed Q-update rule is depicted in
Fig. 2, where a special case with |S| = |A| = 2 and L = 3
is shown.
First, encrypted values of the initial Q-function
Q0 = (Q
[0](1, 1), Q[0](1, 2), Q[0](2, 1), Q[0](2, 2))
are recorded on the cloud’s memory. At time step t = 1,
the state-action pair (s1, a1) = (1, 1) is visited, so the
encrypted data set z1 = (s1, a1, r1, s2, a2) is uploaded
to the cloud. The computation (4) for Q(1, 1)-update is
initiated, which will take three time steps to complete.
While the Q(1, 1) is being updated on the next L− 1 time
steps (i.e., t = 2, 3), the corresponding state s = 1 is
added to the list of blocking states. When the state s is
blocking, no updates are allowed to the entries of Q(s, ·).
For instance, at t = 2, the state-action pair (s2, a2) = (1, 2)
is visited. However, since the state s = 1 is in a blocking
state list, the update request is rejected and the data set
z2 = (s2, a2, r2, s3, a3) is discarded. At t = 3, the state-
action pair (2, 2) is visited. Since s = 2 is not blocking
at t = 3, the update is accepted, and the computation
of Q(2, 2) update is initiated using the new data set
z3 = (s3, a3, r3, s4, a4). At t = 4, the computation for
Q(1, 1) is complete and the result Q[1](1, 1) is recorded
on the memory. (Q[k](i, u) meaning the k-th revision of
the Q(i, u).) Since the state-action pair (s4, a4) = (1, 2) is
visited when the state s = 1 is removed from the blocking
list, a new data set z4 is accepted and the computation for
Q(1, 2)-update is initiated.
Under SARSA(0) with blocking states described above, we
denote by Qt the most updated version of the Q-function
recorded on the memory as of time step t. For instance,
Fig. 2 reads
Q10 = (Q
[1](1, 1), Q[1](1, 2), Q[0](2, 1), Q[2](2, 2)).
Let mt = mt(st, at) be the number of times that the
update has been accepted at the state-action pair (s, a)
prior to time step t. Whenever the update with data
zt−L = (st−L, at−L, rt−L, st−L+1, at−L+1) is accepted at
time step t−L, the following update is made at time step
t:
Qt(st−L, at−L) = (1− αmt−L)Qt−L(st−L, at−L)
+ αmt−L (rt−L + γQt−L(st−L+1, at−L+1)) .
Since the blocking mechanism ensures that the entries
Qk(st−L, ·) are unchanged over the time steps t − L ≤
k ≤ t− 1, the above update rule can also be written as
Qt(st−L, at−L) = (1− αmt−L)Qt−1(st−L, at−L)
+ αmt−L (rt−L + γQt−1(st−L+1, at−L+1)) .
Definition 4. We define the decreasing  policy with de-
lay similarly to the decreasing  policy (Definition 2)
except that greedy actions are selected by at+1 =
arg maxa∈AQt−1(st+1, a), where Qt−1 is the most updated
version of the Q-function available at t− 1.
We have the following convergence result.
Theorem 5. For an arbitrarily chosen Q0, the convergence
Qt(s, a) → Q∗(s, a) as t → ∞ for each state-action pair
(s, a) ∈ S×A occurs with probability one under SARSA(0)
with delayed update and blocking if the decreasing  policy
with delay is adopted.
Proof. We will prove that, under delayed update and
blocking mechanism, (i) every state is explored infinitely
often, and (ii) the update is still executed infinitely often,
and (iii) the policy is greedy in the limit, again satisfying
the convergence conditions.
(i) Since the decreasing  policies with and without delay
(Definitions 2 and 4) share the same probability t(s) for
random exploration, the inequality
∑∞
i=1 Pr(ats(i) = a) ≥∑∞
i=1 c/i =∞ remains valid under the decreasing  policy
with delay. As in the proof of Theorem 3, this implies that
each state-action pair is visited infinitely often.
(ii) Assume that update occurs only K(< ∞) times for
some state-action pair (s, a). Since L < ∞, the Q-update
can be blocked at most K(L−1)(<∞) times. This means
that updates are accepted infinitely many times, and this
contradicts the assumption that updates occur only K
times.
(iii) The policy is greedy in the limit in that
E|Qt−1(st−L+1, at−L+1)−max
a∈A
Qt−1(st−L+1, a)| → 0 (5)
as t → ∞ with probability one. To see this, suppose that
at−L+1 was a greedy action selected at time step t − L,
i.e.,
at−L+1 = arg max
a∈A
Qt−L(st−L+1, a).
Due to the blocking mechanism, Qk(st−L, ·) are unchanged
over the time steps t− L ≤ k ≤ t− 1. This means that
at−L+1 = arg max
a∈A
Qt−1(st−L+1, a).
Thus, whenever at−L+1 was selected greedily at t− L, we
have
Qt−1(st−L+1, at−L+1)−max
a∈A
Qt−1(st−L+1, a)) = 0.
Since the delayed -greedy policy is greedy in the limit,
the convergence (5) holds with probability one.
4. NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATION
We used a classical pole-balancing problem from RL.
The setup can be found from Sutton and Barto (2018).
With slight modifications, we demonstrate our encrypted
SARSA(0) updates. For encryption, we used Microsoft
SEAL to set up the CKKS scheme. Algorithm 1 is the
pseudocode of Encrypted SARSA(0) with delayed up-
dates. We assumed that the client transmitted Q-values
directly corresponding to the state-action pair it visited.
We fixed a step size αmt(st,at) = α and we queued the
data sets at the client’s memory to take advantage of
a batch encryption. We let the data set to be zi =
(Qi(si, ai), ri, Qi(si+1, ai+1), α, γ) and we simply use Q
′
i
for Qi(si+1, ai+1). Instead of attempting to encrypt and
upload the data zi every time step, we assumed the situ-
ation where the agent can explore longer and collect the
larger data sets. The agent then uploads the batch data
and the cloud computes back the batch update. We use a
tilde to denote the encoded version (e.g., z˜ to be the en-
coded version of L data sets, z˜ = Encode([zt−L, . . . , zt−1]))
and a symbol # in front to denote the encrypted version
(e.g., #z˜ is the encrypted version, #z˜ = Encrypt(z˜)).
Table 1 lists the CKKS Parameters used for the demon-
stration. Table 2 shows the delay introduced by operations
involved in Homomorphic Encryption. The maximum pre-
cision error by encrypted updates was only 0.0063%. We
used L = 1000 to generate the particular result below
and accordingly only 1000 slots were used out of 4096
available slots (encryption parameter-specific). But the
time taken by each operation of homomorphic encryption
listed in Table 2 is fixed for all L ≤ 4096, and thus it
can allow larger batch operations if necessary. We verified
that, given enough trials, learning outcomes remain suc-
cessful for large L and can learn much faster than small L
by performing more compact and less frequent encrypted
operations.
We note that the client is still burdened with non-trivial
computing tasks, most notably CKKS encoding and homo-
morphic encryption, which takes up more than a half of
the homomorphic operations involved. On the other hand,
decryption and decoding tasks are less strenuous. This is a
prevalent issue in encrypted control as seen in the results of
Darup et al. (2018) and many others, dwindling the appeal
of cloud-based control. This result is therefore encouraging
for a further investigation in possibility of outsourcing the
encryption itself. A novel concept in this direction was
first suggested in Naehrig et al. (2011), where one can
combine the relatively light AES encryption to offload the
homomorphic encryption process all together to the cloud.
But even without such future improvements, in certain
control synthesis problems, the homomorphic encryption-
induced computing requirements and delays may be well
compensated with the privacy guarantee acquired. An-
other significant task we note is Relinearization. But this
task is for the cloud during the homomorphic operations.
Algorithm 1 Encrypted SARSA(0)
Client (Start)
1: Perform actions and state transitions L times accord-
ing to the up-to-date Q-table values
2: Store data zi, where i = t− L, . . . , t− 1
3: Encode [zt−L, . . . , zt−1] and get z˜
4: Encrypt and get #z˜ and upload to the cloud
Cloud
1: Update: #Q˜← (1−#α˜)#Q˜+ #α˜(#r˜ + #γ˜#Q˜′)
2: Upload the updated #Q˜ back to the Client.
Client
1: Decrypt #Q˜ to get Q˜
2: Decode Q˜ to get the updated vector of Qi’s
3: go to Start
Table 1. Encryption Parameters
CKKS Parameters Chosen
N (Poly. Modulus Deg.) 8192
q (Cipher. Coeff. Modulus) (250, 230, 230, 230, 250)
Scale Factor 230
Available Slots 4096
5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We tackled a problem of privately outsourced control.
In this work, we provide a general framework for con-
trol synthesis over fully homomorphic encryption. We
Table 2. Number of operations and average
time consumed per each batch update
Type Num Time (ms) Percent
Encode 5 6.695 23.59 %
Encrypt 5 33.519 39.38 %
Multiply 4 2.549 2.99 %
Relinearize 4 14.909 17.51 %
Rescale 4 7.886 9.26 %
Addition 3 0.074 0.09 %
Decrypt 1 1.225 1.44 %
Decode 1 4.881 5.73 %
showed a convergence result for the SARSA(0) with de-
layed updates. We then demonstrated solving a classi-
cal reinforcement learning problem with a privacy objec-
tive and privacy-induced delayed updates. Numerical re-
sults showed that the homomorphic encryption via CKKS
scheme could successfully complete the private learning
with the precision loss being minimal. We saw that a batch
operation can be of our advantage.
Many challenges remain for encrypted control. Obviously,
the delays introduced may limit the area of applications.
However, as we considered in this paper, using homomor-
phic encryption for control synthesis may be feasible. The
other critical challenge is the difficulty of implementing
certain critical operations such as comparison and sorting
over FHE. This makes the execution of Bellman operations
or optimizations on ciphertext domain challenging. As our
future work seeks to extend our framework to more ad-
vanced evaluation tasks such as training and execution of
artificial neural network or control synthesis, (e.g., model
predictive control) over fully homomorphic encryption, an
efficient polynomial comparison function will be of signifi-
cant value. We will also continue to investigate the idea of
outsourcing the homomorphic encryption task as discussed
to improve our framework.
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